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Abstract:  
"Are we watching, in the succession of history, the appearance and disappearance of legal systems or assisting, 
in a greater or lesser extent, to what might be considered, in a sense, an evolution of those systems?"
1
Law, indissolubly linked to the general evolution of society, has recorded a number of differences in time and 
space, both in terms of content of various types and positive law systems, and also in terms of forms that take the 
rules of law, authorities who have the ability to edict it or the procedure to be followed.Indeed, there is no law 
for all times and all places, as law is not an abstract product of our reason, it comes from the human experience, 
it is a product of history and that is why institutions of each society can only be different from one society to 
another.
2 But, as in reality there are not quantities of history - many, little or very little - but just history
3, we can 
say that in typology there is not socialist law absolutely different from bourgeois, feudal or slave law, so there is 
just law.
By this approach, I wanted to bring back into question the existence of some factors of constancy in law, those 
"legal  permanencies”  investigated  by  Edmond  Picard,  believing  that  "there  is  something  in  the  legal 
relationship that necessarily subsist anywhere”
4.
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Introduction:
This subject has been researched in the specialized literature under different aspects: unity and 
diversity in law typology, “given” and “constructed”, continuity and discontinuity in law.  
Unity and Diversity in Law Typology 
Any state has its legislated laws, in accordance to its own social-political exigencies, to the 
traditions and values it proclaims. Unlike the principles of natural rights, the legislated norms are 
variable over time and space.  
Man himself renders different value to the abstract concept of equal chances and the abstract 
freedom of choice. We are born with a common biological setting, nonetheless we each consolidate 
our own features, aspirations, values. And, although we are alike through the values which are given 
to us, we are different by the capitalizations we make. There is no perfect, timeless, spatial and 
universally moral model.  
Individual identity is given by the sense of belonging to a certain community and therefore the 
potential conflicts that might arise cannot be settled through instituting a universal positive law; the 
law of each state represents the expression of living experience.  
Our planet’s mankind is not at the present moment in the same historical phase or stage
5.
Correspondences and contamination between cultures are common, however uniformity is out of the 
question.  Behaviors  differ  depending  on  race,  ethnics  and  religion.  The  normative  structure  of 
 Lecturer phd, The Faculty of Juridical Sciences Nicolae Titulescu University, Bucharest, V c resti Blvd, N
o.
185, Bucharest, Romania, (e-mail:elena_comsa@yahoo.com). 
1 Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Cuvânt înainte, in „Studii  i cercet ri juridice”, nr. I/1956. 
2 Radu I. Motica, Gheorghe Mihai, Teoria general  a dreptului, (Bucuresti, Ed. All Beck, 2001), p. 35. 
3 Radu I. Motica, Gheorghe C. Mihai, Fundamentele dreptului. Optima justi ie, ( Bucuresti, Ed. All Beck, 
1999), p. 7. 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Gh. Mihai, Fundamentele dreptului. Teoria izvoarelor dreptului obiectiv, vol. III, ( Bucuresti, Edit. All Beck, 
2004), p. 47 595
communities has always differed from one tribe to another, from one people to another, from one 
nation  to  another.  Even  the  Romans,  who  conquered  so  many  people,  understood  the  existing 
differences between civilizations and did not impose the established law of Rome to abolish the 
existing rules governing the conquered people.  
The evolution of the human civilization is not a uniform process. Thus, every law areas and 
types  emphasized  by  historical  evolution  have  specific  particularities,  which  are  determined  by 
ensemble set of factors influencing law, rendering it dynamic, of evolutive nature, distinctive. The 
natural framework, social-political transformations from one phase to another, the interests of social 
structures, human individuals with their aspirations, the role played by tradition in different historical 
moments, ideological differences, in other words, the totality of factors that have configured the law 
have  generated  changes  in  the  normative  contents  of  the  law,  qualitative  and  quantitative 
modifications in the systematical structure of law, emphasizing on one hand the idea of juridical 
progress and, on the other hand, the fact that there cannot exist an universally valid legislation.  
However, summing up, we can say that just as history cannot be expressed as a quantity a lot 
of history, very much history, some history, very little history – but there simply is history
6, there is 
no socialist law in typology that is absolutely different than the bourgeois law, the feudal or the slave 
law, but there is law; institutions and principles exist that are based on roman law and that have 
survived  over  societies  that  have  created  them,  being  applied  throughout  millennial  evolution; 
notions and concepts exist (such as subjective right, legal deed, legal act, legal will) that surpass 
national framework and have the same significance in any theory on the system of law; a general 
theory of law exists (juridical encyclopedia) that “chooses from all law elements what is essential, 
what  constitutes  the  very  articulation  of  legal  thinking  and  by  willingly  establishing  its  logical 
process, defines what law is”.
 7
Therefore, there cannot exist a common legislation for all societies however “there is in the 
juridical relation something that necessary subsists anywhere”
8 and that “something” is represented 
by the legal permanencies, the constant aspects of law, subject matter to the legal encyclopedia.  
Given and Constructed in Law 
Montesquieu drew attention over the fact that “the laws that seem opposed are in some cases 
based on the same spirit”.
9 In this context, we will attempt to answer the following question: can the 
legislator  create  (“originate”)  the  law  by  simply  establishing  norms  in  the  form  and  upon  the 
procedure required by laws or, on the contrary, besides these “exterior marks”, is the legislator 
conditioned by some merits, contents criteria because of which the efficiency and validity of legal 
norms depend?
 10
François Gény distinguishes between the “given” that arises from the very nature of things, 
and exists prior to the legal phenomenon, and the “constructed”, which consists of the legislator’s 
work. As regards the “given” aspects of social life, Gény classified such in four categories:  
a) real “given”, consisting of all conditions that arise from the nature of things and that 
impose themselves to any will (both natural conditions and conditions that refer to the anatomic and 
psychological structure of man, his moral aspirations); 
b) historical “given”, that accompany mankind evolution, and provide such with a series of 
precepts arising out oflived experiences (for example those concerning private property); 
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c) rational “given”, meaning the totality of rules dictated by reason, basically referring to the 
content of natural rights;  
d) ideal “given”, that concentrates all aspirations, feelings, beliefs of mankind in respect with 
the progress of positive right, the utmost objective to which law aims.  
Paul  Roubier  also is  of  the  similar idea that  the  work of  legal  creation has  two phases: 
acknowledging such “given” elements of social life and based on them constructing the legal rule
11.
By analyzing the basics of legal rules, Roubier shows that in case the legislator creates the legal rule 
without taking into consideration the “given” aspects of the social order, then the legislator creates a 
useless piece of work. Consequently, there are three groups of factors that need to be taken into 
consideration: economical factors (interests), religious and moral factors (traditions) and political and 
social factors (ideologies). 
Emphasizing the importance of the fact that the historical materialism developed by Karl 
Marx exaggerated the importance of the economical factor, placing such as the basis of all social 
phenomena, Roubier considered it was absurd to render unilateral explanation to great historical 
events, whereas such are always based on a complex set of causes. 
Essentially,  Marx  asserted  that  the  legislator  did  not  invent  laws,  but  merely  formulates 
such.
12 In the opinion of Marxist philosophy, the rights (equivalent to positive rights) is the result to 
the conscious creation of people; nevertheless, Marxism admits the idea of a “given” in law, which it 
places  in  the  natural  and  social  environment  and  in  the  framework  of  which  the  work  of 
“constructing” law is developed. 
The Marxist philosophy considers that the legislator cannot create laws randomly but, in order 
for the legal norms to be efficient, a series of factors must be taken into consideration regarding not 
only the form but also the grounds of juridical regulations, which factors compose the “given” side of 
law and that concern social relations, the human factor and objective laws on the development of 
society and thinking.  
Therefore,  the  relations  established  between  people  at  a  certain  historical  moment 
(economical, political, cultural, family relations) represent a fundamental “given” aspect of the law 
whereas, on one hand, they represent the subject matter of legal provisions and, on the other hand, by 
their specific nature, by means of their influence over the human reason, feelings and will, they drive 
the solutions comprised in such provisions.
13 Nonetheless, the action of law over social relations is 
always meant as a participation of the legal conscience
14, an idea which will be further developed 
herein.  
Man is a complex factor to be considered by the legislator; man, with his biological and social 
specific nature, is a product of his era, is a fundamental “given” of law, from two standpoints: as 
subject of the legal provisions and furthermore as their addressee. His interests, beliefs, ideals are the 
ones that drive the legislator’s activity and the evolution of law.  
Moreover, only if the aims set up by the legislator and the solutions created in order to fulfill 
such are in accordance with the laws of nature and society development, then legal provisions can 
play a positive social role, guiding society’s evolution on a normal path, and not hinder historical 
development.  That  is  because  “efficiency  can  only  be  achieved  grounded  on  what  exists.  The 
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purposes only have a precise significance if they are adapted to the means. Problems are not socially 
meaningful unless they can be solved”
15 and law giving is the product of discerning human actions.  
The study of the three main components of the “given” aspect in law shape the Marxist notion 
over the historical nature of law, over its dependency of time and place conditions as well as the 
powerful  connection  established  by  Marxism  between  the  right  of  every  formation  and  the 
development level of the production forces at a given moment.  
Continuity and Discontinuity in Law  
The idea of a “given” aspect in law does not have to lead to establishing some general and 
invariable criteria, situated beyond human experience, which criteria would discipline creation in 
law.  On  the  contrary,  the  “given” in  law  being  itself  variable,  explains  the  existing  differences 
between legal systems, also under the aspect of content and finality of legal regulations belonging to 
some different types of law.  
Admitting nonetheless that, on a psychological level, in the way of thinking of an age traces 
can be found of the thinking method of the previous age/ages and, furthermore that life does not start 
over with every instauration of a new production method (idea which has been emphasized from the 
very beginning of this research), we can mention a series of continuity elements in the “given” aspect 
of law and, in addition, the transposing of such into “constructed” of law as well.
16
Thus,  referring  to  social  relations  in  various  historical  ages,  we  can  easily  notice  the 
differences of content between ownership relations in the slave society, for example, and that of 
feudal, bourgeois and socialist societies; however through an abstractization process, elements of 
continuity can be noticed on the level of such relations’ structure, which elements are reflected in law 
under two aspects: in the juridical regulation subject matter – the fact that certain categories of social 
relations (ownership relations, relations between spouses, between seller and buyer) are regulated in 
all areas of law; in the logical-conceptual mechanism – certain legal categories and concepts (such as 
the ownership ones, contract, juridical rapport) can be found in all the systems of law, emphasizing 
the permanent value of the logical structure of law.
Irrespective  of  the  existing  differences,  all  law  families  (German-Roman,  Anglo-Saxon, 
Muslim,  etc)  protect  the  same  fundamental  institutions:  individual’s  primate,  property,  family. 
Although etatic law changes along with states (34 at the beginning of the 20
h century, approximately 
102 at the middle of the same century, over 200 at the beginning of the 21
st century),
17 the notion of 
legal norm does not render different meanings, but it has “the same significance, same legal function 
and  the same  logical form, irrespective time and  space, and regardless to the legislator and the 
normative form that includes it”. 
Professors Traian Iona cu and Eugen A. Barasch, while researching the legal institution of 
contract in socialist and bourgeois law, reveal that what has changed from one regime to another are 
the interests to which the law serves; therefore, the end scope of the two types of contracts are 
different from one age to another, thus “the contract in the socialist law is a whole new different 
contract”
18. Nevertheless, in both regimes the concept of contract exists and thus the concepts are 
maintained,  while  what  changes  are  the  concepts’  functions,  the  substance;  the  same  technical 
construction, i.e. the contract –, takes, fundamentally different end scopes and contents. 
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A current positive does not cease connections with the precedent positive law, meaning a 
series of principles and normative ideas are maintained. The institution of the civil contract, the 
principle of liability for an illegal action, are not the creations of a certain modern positive law, but 
have  instead  a  millenary  legal  oldness
19.  Conclusive  to  such  end  is  the  way  how  many  of  the 
principles, institutions, concepts  and categories created  by the Roman  law have  survived to the 
society which had created them and were taken over and successfully applied in feudal society as 
well as in the modern one.  
To this end, the words of Professor N. Popa are clarifying: “In the case of law, but not only, it 
is necessary that each time we start with the Greek and Roman antiquity because that is where the 
source of the entire European development lies. Although nowadays society is no longer similar to 
the old one, while the institutions which govern us are radically different, somewhere deep, at the 
level of the founding principles, universally valid ideas can be found, which govern us in the present 
as well.”
20
 The existence of principles is innermost related to human activity; “law cannot function 
outside general principles.”
21They constitute the underlayer of positive law. The general principles of 
law represent a stability factor in law; they ensure the legal system’s evolution, the continuity of the 
legal order and are characterized by longevity. If the loss or modification of a simple law rule is only 
“of episodic nature”, then eliminating a principle “risks causing a large damage to the legal order 
because the fate of numerous legal rules is at stake”
22.
In this respect, Professor Nicolae Popa shows that the general principles of law have a double 
dialectics
23. The internal dialectics refers to “the set of internal connections characteristic to the legal 
system,  the  interferences  of  its  composing  parts”,  while  the  external  dialectics  regards  the 
dependency  between  principles  and  the  set  of  social  conditions,  being  reflected  in  the  legal 
conscience of a nation at a certain moment; its evolution imposes the “rethinking of some principles 
in accordance to the economical-social mutations that demand for adequacy according to the legal 
regulations and institutions”
24.
Continuity in law also has that law fundamental “given” aspect, consisting of objective social 
laws, the action of which sometimes exceeds the frame of a single social-economical formation; for 
instance, the law of value, whereas “the precise law is unviable outside values, which values are 
always typically expressed in the wording of a law system’s principles.” 
25
The more so the human factor, the central area of interest for the legislator, represents a 
continuity factor in law, on one hand, through their physical, biological, physiological characteristics 
– which are common to all people – and on the other hand, due to volitions, ideals, interests for 
which they have fought along history and which are also found in the plan of legal regulations’ end 
scope. Therefore, the history of human rights can be synthetically described as being the struggle for 
having human dignity respected by the state authorities.  
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In its grand historical-spatial diversity, in spite of the normal differences, the law presents a 
permanent nature represented by a bunch of constants. Law does not mean the simple recording of 
facts but also the permanent relation to values and principles and, thus, observing these constant 
guide marks.  
Professor Djuvara considers that “the law can be a science, and the legal knowledge changes 
also into science when, having as an objective a higher number of documents related to law, they 
arrange and relate them according to their essential characteristics through legal notions or principles 
that are universally valid, just like the laws of nature”. 
26
The Transition from “Given” to “Constructed”: Legal Conscience 
Researching the fundament of legal regulations and end scopes pursued by such represents the 
essential task of legal science. But scientific research, fundamental or applicative, is elaborated in 
consideration of practice. Research means knowledge, practice means action, it calls for finding 
solutions to answer the needs revealed by theory.
27Establishing what it is, the scientific research has 
to also determine what it could be, what it needs to be. As emphasized by Paul Roubier
28, the 
essentially normative nature situates law science in the “has to be” domain and subordinates it to the 
law of end purpose an, unlike sociology, which is an explanation science, dominated by the laws of 
causality and necessity. Law is not simple “social engineering”, but it implies a social order inclined 
to reaching some end purposes.  
Any  positive  law  has  its  end  scopes  of  which  the  law  makes  use  differently,  “legally 
dimensioning such, measured in terms of times and people; the Nazi social order, Arabic-Saudi or 
Japanese one do not portray the same meaning”.
29
The scientific research pursues at detecting that process of transition from “given” aspects to 
“constructed” aspects, from what it is to what it could be, from indicative to imperative. Social 
efficacy of law depends on the degree of compliance between “given” and “constructed”.  
The law creation activity cannot be arbitrary; tracing the correct line between necessity and 
freedom implies finding optimal solutions for assuring a climate that is favorable to all; the transition 
from what it is to what it should be is made by means of legal conscience.  
Law, before being a normative state, is a state of conscience, a set of representations, ideas, 
beliefs. Legal conscience thus appears as a premise to law giving and the enforcement of law norms. 
Juridical  reality  does  not  only  imply  norms,  but  also  assumes  value  judgments,  legal 
conscience, relating to facts and interests. Therefore, “a law system can only exist if its creators and 
addressees are aware of it”.
30
The  transition  from  sein  to  sollen implies,  first  of  all,  knowing  and  understanding  the 
phenomena of social life (the cognitive phase of legal conscience), so that those necessities that claim 
for legal regulation can be selected; legal conscience then proceeds to their examination, in its aim to 
take from the entire set only the social relations that, in relation to the interests that need to be 
protected, will wear the legal clothing (action hypostasis); also the axiological phase implies their 
capitalization, establishing the essential solutions that need to be promoted and the technical-legal 
means through which such can be inserted in law order. 
The legal conscience has a complex structure: legal ideology contains elements of rational 
nature by which it is understood what it is, and legal psychology, composed of affective elements, 
refers to what must be accomplished.
31
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The shift from conscience to norm is a process carried out through that determining factor of 
legal conscience, legal will, focused on the regulation of social relations, which will the legislator 
rises to the level of state will, expressed in the form of legal norms.
32
Legal conscience and, consequently, the law, are changing along with the society in which 
they have appeared, depending to the ruling process such reflects. The form changes (law, legal 
conscience) correspond to some content modifications.  
However, in spite of the existing differences between legal civilizations, there can easily be 
noticed the common aspects that compose the essence of law. To research the essence of law implies 
entering the intimacy of legal phenomenon, noticing its internal qualities, “establishing its substance” 
(Aristotle). Legal will is that which can be found in every norm and in the set of laws; irrespective 
the transformations faced by law, such legal will, of mandatory nature, represents a constant element 
of law.  
Nevertheless, from the point of view of essence, the law systems are “identical”, in terms of 
the way how they organize the content they are different from one another.  
Conclusions 
By distinguishing in any legal relation a factual element and a rational one, Mircea Djuvara 
shows that, as two individuals having the same figure or two leaves with identical shape cannot exist, 
the same goes for two factual relations that cannot be identical in their entire complexity
33. The 
factual element always varies from on moment to another. “Laws do not remain the same, although 
their letter stays the same…The way in which Napoleon code is applied today is in many ways 
different than the one applied 100 years ago; how it is applied in our country is in many ways 
different that in France”.  
Therefore, “the idea law is fixed, eternal, immutable, purely rational, however its content 
varies”. In their content, legislations are always different, norms and regulations differ in time and 
space, but in essence and form, constant elements do subsist.  
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